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Choosing Choices:
Agenda Selection with Uncertain Issues∗
Raphael Godefroy† Eduardo Perez-Richet‡
Abstract
This paper studies selection rules i.e. the procedures committees use to choose whether
to place an issue on their agenda. The main ingredient of the model is that committee
members are uncertain about their final preferences at the selection stage: they only
know the probability that they will eventually prefer the proposal to the status quo at
the decision stage. This probability is private information. We find that a more stringent
selection rule makes the voters more conservative. Hence individual behavior reinforces
the effect of the rule instead of balancing it. For a voter, conditional on being pivotal,
the probability that the proposal is adopted depends on which option she eventually
favors. The probability that the proposal is adopted if she eventually prefers the proposal
increases at a higher rate with the selection rule than if she eventually prefers the status
quo. In order to compensate for that, the voters become more selective. The decision rule
has the opposite effect. We describe optimal rules when there is a fixed cost of organizing
the final election.
Keywords: Selection Rules, Strategic Voting, Asymmetric Information, Agenda Setting,
Large Deviations, Petitions, Citizens’ Initiative.
JEL classification: D72, D83.
1 Introduction
Before they can be decided according to a majority rule, cases brought to the Supreme Court
of the United States need to be approved for selection by at least four of the nine justices. This
Rule of Four, which is rather a custom than a constitutional requirement, was used as a defense
by the justices when in the mid-1930s the Court came under fire from the president and the
Congress. It was accused, among other charges, of “using its discretionary jurisdiction to duck
important cases,”1 to which the justices responded that they use a submajority rule precisely
∗Preliminary and incomplete. Comments are welcome.
†Paris School of Economics, email: godefroy@pse.ens.fr, web: http://www.pse.ens.fr/godefroy/
‡Ecole Polytechnique, mail: eduardo.perez@polytechnique.edu, web: http://eduardo.perez.free.fr
181 Cong. Rec. 2809-2812 (1939).
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because they prefer “to be at fault in taking jurisdiction rather than to be at fault in rejecting
it.”2 The argument of the justices seems obvious at first, it is easier to gather four votes than
five. Yet it is not so clear once we take strategic behavior into account: wouldn’t the justices
offset the effects of the selection rule by adjusting their individual behavior? We show that it is
not the case by presenting a model in which rational individual behavior strengthens the effects
of the selection rule: voters become more conservative as the rule becomes more stringent.
Selection rules are not limited to the Supreme Court3. For instance, any member of the
French Assemble´e Nationale can place a proposal in the agenda of the parliament as long as the
proposed law doesn’t increase expenditure for the government. In the United States Congress,
bills must be approved by vote in a specialized standing committee before they can be brought
to the floor. The agenda of the European Union’s main decision-making body, the Council of
the European Union, is prepared by the Committee of Permanent Representatives. Citizens’
initiatives, which allow a group of citizens to obtain the organization of a referendum by way of
petitions, are another form of selection rules. They play an important role in some jurisdictions.
For example, the gathering of a sufficient number of signatures led to the 2003 California recall
election and ultimately to the recall of Governor Gray Davis. In November 2009, a citizens’
initiative led to a ban on the construction of minarets in Switzerland creating a controversy
across Europe which led some commentators to question this procedure4. A general concern
about citizens’ initiatives is that they tend to bring too many issues to the agenda. Our study
suggests that outcomes may be particularly sensitive to the selection rule that is chosen because
of the positive feedback between the direct effect of a change in the rule and the indirect effect
on behavior. Finally, recruiting committees also use selection rules.
2Hearings on S. 2176 before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 74th Cong. 1st sess., 9-10 (1935) (statement
of Justice Van Devanter). We found a discussion of these events and the citations in Epstein and Knight (1998)
p.86 who refer to a memorandum titled “The Rule of Four” that justice Marshall circulated to conference Sept.
21, 1983. For a detailed account of the selection procedure at the Supreme Court, see Perry (1994).
3State Supreme Courts also use selection rules. In California, for example, the justices use a supermajority
rule of four out of seven justices.
4A European Citizens’ Initiative is about to come into effect as decided in the Lisbon treaty, but with limited
scope as it would only allow a group of citizens to place an issue on the agenda of the European commission. In
France, a mixed initiative system between citizens and member of parliaments has been adopted in July 2008.
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Our model allows us to analyze and compare these rules. To our knowledge, it is the first
formal analysis of selection rules in a rational voting framework. Our two working assumption
are (i) that voters are uncertain about their preferences at the selection stage: they only know
the probability that they will eventually prefer the proposal to the status quo; and (ii) that this
probability is private information. The second assumption is a standard private preferences
assumption. At least two arguments support the assumption that voters are uncertain about
their final preferences. First, voters are likely to have less information about the issue at the
selection stage than at the decision stage. Once an issue is selected, hearings of experts and
stakeholders may be organized, public attention and the media may help produce and aggregate
information about the issue itself and the preferences of the people which may affect those of
their representatives. Second, the process leading to the final proposal is often complex and
tends to generate uncertainty at the outset about the nature of the final proposal. In parlia-
ments, when a bill is introduced to the floor, it usually goes through long series of amendments
that often modify the text of the proposal substantially and unpredictably. Similarly, at the
Supreme Court, there is uncertainty about which of the justices will be assigned to write the
opinion and about which exact policy relevant points will be raised. Whereas the literature on
agenda setting has generally focused on the process leading from the initial proposal to its final
version, we are more interested in how initial proposals (issues) are selected and placed on the
agenda in the first place. Our approach is to black-box this transformation process and merely
assume that it creates uncertainty about what will be voted on in the final stage.
We also assume that voters believe the preference parameter (the probability that they
prefer the proposal) of other voters to be drawn independently from an identical distribution.
It is arguably more natural to assume private information in a framework with heterogeneous
preferences like ours than in the homogeneous preferences framework of the literature on piv-
otal voting where individuals have private information about a common event. Indeed, while
deliberation can be expected to make all the information public in the case of homogeneous
preferences, there is no particular reason to assume that it would do so in general in the case
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of heterogeneous preferences5.
The basic model is a two-round voting procedure. In the first round, the selection stage,
committee members vote to select an issue. In the second round, the decision stage, they decide
whether to adopt a proposal or maintain the status quo. Even though voters’ preferences are
private, one’s expected utility at the selection stage depends indirectly on the preferences,
hence on the private information, of other voters since they determine the probability that the
proposal will pass the final round if it is selected. Therefore, the selection stage aggregates
strategically relevant information about the probabilities of different outcomes. Rational voters
condition their decision on the event that their vote is pivotal. The exact information conveyed
by the pivotal event, however, depends on the selection rule. When a rule requires a higher
tally of votes to select an issue, the event that a single vote is pivotal conveys the information
that more voters are likely to favor the proposal at the decision stage. Therefore, conditional
on being pivotal at the selection stage, a voter who votes to select an issue faces a higher chance
that the status quo will be reversed when the selection rule is more stringent. When selecting
an issue, however, a voter also keeps the option to vote against change in the second round so
this increased probability is not sufficient to explain her behavior. Rather, the voter compares
the probability that the proposal passes when she eventually prefers it to when she doesn’t. It
is the ratio between these two probabilities that determines her strategy. We show that the
probability that the proposal passes given that the voter does not support it increases at a
higher rate with the selection rule than does the same probability given that the voter supports
the proposal. In order to compensate for that, voters become individually more conservative
when the rule itself is more conservative6. Remarkably, this result is completely independent
of the particular distribution of preferences. Our formal analysis requires the committee to be
large for the result to hold. However, we also conducted numerical calculations of equilibria for
different type distributions and committee sizes without ever invalidating the result.
5For an analysis of deliberation that supports this claim see Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2006).
6This account leaves some details aside. Indeed the equilibria that we consider (symmetric) are not unique
in general and, in standard practice, the exact comparative statics result is that both the minimum and the
maximum equilibrium thresholds move as explained with the selection rule.
4
We extend our analysis to selection in subcommittees as in the United States Congress.
Using Dekel and Piccione (2000), we also show that the analysis applies to sequential selection
procedures such as petitions for citizens’ initiatives.
Finally, while these results uncover an interesting general feature of selection rules, they
have nothing to say about why these rules should be used, why they exist or which rules are
optimal. In order to address these more normative questions, we assume the existence of a fixed
cost to organize the second stage election and derive the efficient rules.
Related Literature. The seminal literature on voting under asymmetric information7 (Austen-
Smith and Banks, 1996; Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1996, 1997, 1998; Myerson, 1998) focused
on the jury model in which agents have common preferences (with possibly heterogeneous inten-
sities) conditional on an unknown state of the world, and private information about this state
of the world. An important insight of this literature is that a strategic voter should reason
as if her vote were pivotal since it is the only event in which her vote has any effect on the
collective decision. Under any voting rule, the pivotal event conveys some information about
the votes of others, and therefore about their private information and what it means about the
state of the world. In our model, each voter’s payoff is independent from the information of
others. Because of the two-round procedure, however, a voter who is uncertain about her final
preferences cares about the preferences of others as they carry information about the chances
of the proposal in the final round. To model voters’ uncertainty about their own preferences,
we draw on the setup of Barbera and Jackson (2004) to which we add asymmetric information.
Several authors have built on the pivotal voting literature to model multiple-round elections.
Piketty (2000) analyses a model of two-round elections and common value with asymmetric
information, in which the winning policy in the first round of voting faces a new proposal in
the second round. Then voters use the first round to communicate their information about the
state of the world to other voters. Razin (2003) extends the idea of voting as signaling to a
model of elections with only one round but where the information communicated during the
7More recent contributions include Duggan and Martinelli (2001), Laslier and Weibull (2009), and Li, Rosen
and Suen (2001). ? estimate a related model on Supreme Court data.
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elections affects future outcomes. Iaryczower (2008) considers signaling in a bicameral system.
Shotts (2006) and Meirowitz and Shotts (2008) study models of repeated elections with possibly
private values and the same signaling motive. By contrast, the signaling channel is completely
absent from our two-round model. Hummel (2009) considers a model of repeated elections with
three candidates in which, as in our model, the outcome of earlier rounds is informative about
the distribution from which the preferences of other voters are drawn. In his model, however,
voters learn their own preferences at the outset.
There is also a rich literature on sequential voting in committees. In these models the
individual members of a committee vote sequentially and can observe prior voting history.
This literature (Battaglini, 2005; Battaglini, Morton and Palfrey, 2007; Callander, 2007; Ali
and Kartik, 2010; Hummel, 2010) tries to find a way around an equivalence result of Dekel
and Piccione (2000) according to which any equilibrium in weakly undominated strategies of a
simultaneous election remains an equilibrium of any sequential election process in which voters
observe prior history. We use their result to extend our model to sequential selection procedures.
Our work is also connected to the literature on agenda setting, foremost because the se-
lection stage of our model is a process of endogenous agenda selection, but also because of
the use of sequential elections in this literature. The topic has been treated from the point
of view of legislative bargaining (Banks and Duggan, 1998, 2000, 2001; Baron and Ferejohn,
1989; Diermeier and Merlo, 2000; Merlo and Wilson, 1995), and by the literature on sequen-
tial agenda (Austen-Smith, 1987; Banks, 1985; Banks and Gasmi, 1987; Bernheim, Rangel and
Rayo, 2006; Dutta, Jackson and Le Breton, 2004; Ferejohn, Fiorina and McKelvey, 1987; Romer
and Rosenthal, 1978; Shepsle and Weingast, 1984). While this literature aims at modeling the
whole process of amendments and modifications of a proposal, we only model the initial decision
of placing an issue on the agenda, and account for the process between the selection and the
decision stage with the assumption that it generates uncertainty at the outset about the final
proposal.
On the technical side, we make an intensive use of large deviation techniques (Dembo and
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Zeitouni, 1998; Hollander, 2000) and saddlepoint approximations (Jensen, 1995) to analyze
the asymptotic behavior of the tail probabilities that characterize our equilibrium. The use
of saddlepoint approximations is, to our knowledge, new to the literature in economic theory.
They are a natural tool for the study of some large elections and could probably be used more
widely.
2 The Model
Voters, Preferences and Information. N = {1, . . . , n} is a committee of n ≥ 2 voters.
If an issue is selected, the voters face a pair of alternatives: the status quo and the proposal.
Information about the proposal is incomplete at the outset, so that a voter i only knows her
probability pi ∈ [0, 1] to be in favor of the proposal. These probabilities are drawn independently
across voters from a distribution with density function f on [0, 1], and cumulative density
function F . f is assumed to have full support and no atoms, except possibly at the extremities
of the support. While the distribution is common knowledge, the realizations are private
information. Let p˜ ≡ ∫ 1
0
zdF (z) denote the mean of this distribution.
Since there are two alternatives, we need only keep track of the difference in payoffs between
them. It is therefore without loss of generality that we normalize the payoff from the status
quo to 0. The payoff of voter i from the proposal is drawn conditionally on her opinion: if
the proposal is adopted, a voter who supports it gets u+i > 0, and a voter in favor of the
default policy gets −u−i < 0. We assume that these random variables have homogeneous
expected values across voters8 that we denote by u+ and u−. At the selection stage of the
two-round voting procedure described below, agents only know the probability that they prefer
the proposal to the default. When an issue is selected and becomes part of the agenda, more
information becomes available to the voters enabling them to form an opinion about the proposal
and learn the intensity of their preferences ui.
8In fact, we only need the ratio of these expected values to be invariant across voters.
7
Voting Procedure. The voting procedure has two stages, the selection stage and the decision
stage. At the selection stage, an issue is placed on the agenda if at least dV ne committee
members select it, where the fraction V ∈ [0, 1] is the selection rule. If the issue is not selected,
the default policy is maintained. If it is selected, the agents vote again to decide whether to
adopt the proposal. The proposal is adopted if more than dvne committee members vote in
favor, where the fraction v ∈ [0, 1] is the decision rule. We let nV = dV ne denote the tally of
votes necessary to select an issue, and ncV = n − nV its complement. Similarly, let nv = dvne
and ncv = n− nv. Finally we will also use the fractions Vn = nV /n and vn = nv/n.
Equilibrium Definition. A selection strategy of voter i is a function σi : [0, 1] → {0, 1}
mapping a probability type pi to a ballot, where 1 means that i votes in favor of selecting the
proposal. For notational simplicity, we do not consider mixing behavior. This is without loss of
generality since we show below that all the best responses feature essentially pure straregies. In
the second stage, the voting strategy of the voter may be conditioned on all or any subset of the
information that may be available to her at this stage: whether she supports the proposal, the
intensity of her preferences, her and other players’ voting strategy in the first round. We consider
sequential equilibria of this game in weakly undominated strategies. This is a standard way to
avoid equilibria in which voters vote for their least preferred policy in binary elections in which
no information is aggregated such as our second-round election, and it also rules out equilibria
in which all agents vote for or against selection irrespective of their private information.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
Decision Stage. Since we ruled out weakly dominated strategies, no matter what observations
a player is allowed to make between rounds, she votes for her preferred policy at the decision
stage. Therefore we can take this sincere voting behavior as given and proceed to analyze the
first-stage game.
Non Strategic Behaviors. There are two possible types of non strategic behaviors at the
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selection stage that can be used as a benchmark. A naive voter would just vote for the alter-
native if its expected payoff piu
+− (1− pi)u− is greater than 0. A more sophisticated behavior
would be to weigh the payoff of the alternative conditionally on eventually liking it or not by
the expected probability that the alternative eventually passes in each of these cases. We call
such voters sophisticated. Let S be a binomial random variable with parameters p˜, and n− 1.
p˜ is the probability with which a random voter is expected to eventually favor the alternative
in the absence of additional information, and S is the random variable a sophisticated voter
would use at the selection stage to estimate the tally of votes in favor of the alternative at the
decision stage in addition to her own.
Proposition 1 (Naive and Sophisticated Voting). Naive voters use a threshold strategy with
the selection threshold tnaive =
u−
u−+u+ which is independent of the voting rule. A sophisticated
voter uses a threshold strategy with the threshold
tsoph =
(
1 +
u+
u−
Pr(S ≥ nv − 1)
Pr(S ≥ nv)
)−1
,
which depends on the decision rule, but is independent of the selection rule.
Strategic Behavior. Given a profile p = (p1, . . . , pn), a voter i knowing the full profile would
expect the following utility if the issue were to be selected in the first stage9
Ui = piu
+
∑
C⊆Ni
#C≥nv−1
∏
j∈C
pj
∏
l∈NirC
(1− pl)− (1− pi)u−
∑
C⊆Ni
#C≥nv
∏
j∈C
pj
∏
l∈NirC
(1− pl), (1)
where Ni = N r {i} is the set of all voters except i. Indeed, with probability pi, i will vote
for the proposal in the second stage, winning if a coalition C of at least nv − 1 other players
(sincerely) vote likewise, which yields an expected payoff of u+. With probability 1 − pi, she
will not support the proposal, and incur the expected loss u− if a coalition of at least nv other
9Note that this function does not satisfy the information smallness assumption of Gerardi and Yariv (2007),
hence allowing for deliberation does not necessarily make different selection rules equivalent as to the sets of
sequential equilibria in weakly undominated strategies that they generate.
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voters concur against the status quo. If the issue is not selected, the status quo prevails and
the expected utility of a voter is 0. We can write Ui = U(pi, p−i), where U is linear and strictly
increasing in a voter’s own type pi.
Even though the values of the policies for the voters are private and independent as well as
their informational types, the two-round process links a voter’s value of selecting an issue to
the types of other voters so that the first round has the analytical features of a common value
election. In particular, the first round of this procedure can aggregate some information. This
information is not about the quality of the proposal or the status quo, or any other factor that
affects the values of the voters for these outcomes. It is about the number of voters likely to
vote for the proposal at the decision stage.
When making her first stage voting decision, the voter only knows her own probability
pi of favoring the final proposal, and must therefore compute the expected value of (1). If
she is rational, she conditions her computation on the event Ei ≡
{∑
j∈Ni σj(pj) = nV − 1
}
that her vote is pivotal, and compares it to the null payoff that she obtains if the issue is
not selected. Because the expression in (1) is strictly increasing in pi, voters use threshold
strategies10 characterized by a threshold ti ∈ [0, 1] such that σi(pi) =

1 if pi > ti
0 if pi < ti
.
The next result characterizes the symmetric equilibrium threshold. Define p(t) ≡
∫ 1
t zdF (z)
1−F (t)
and p(t) ≡
∫ t
0 zdF (z)
F (t)
as the expectation of p conditional on lying above (respectively, below) a
threshold t. These functions are strictly increasing and continuously differentiable on [0, 1]. Let
X(t) be a generic Bernoulli random variable that takes the value 1 with probability p(t). We
denote by X1, X2, · · · , Xk an i.i.d. sample of size k of this random variable. Similarly, X(t) is
a generic Bernoulli random variable with parameter p(t).
Suppose other voters use a threshold t. Conditional on her vote being pivotal, a voter knows
that exactly nV − 1 of the other n − 1 voters have a probability to prefer the proposal above
10Other strategies are dominated. The prescription of the strategy when pi = ti, which is an event of measure
0, is essentially irrelevant for the analysis.
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t. Therefore she estimates that the tally of votes that will be ultimately cast in favor of the
proposal if the issue is selected is given by the random variable
Sn(t) = X1(t) + · · ·+XnV −1(t) +X1(t) + · · ·+XncV (t).
Hence the expected utility of a voter of type p conditional on being pivotal is given by
pPr
(
Sn(t) ≥ nv − 1
)
u+ − (1− p) Pr(Sn(t) ≥ nv)u−.
The best response of this player to a threshold t ∈ (0, 1) is to use the threshold
βn(t) =
(
1 +
u+
u−
Pr
(
Sn(t) ≥ nv − 1
)
Pr
(
Sn(t) ≥ nv
) )−1 ∈ [0, 1).
When t ∈ {0, 1}, the probability that the voter is pivotal is in general 0, and therefore any
strategy is a best response. But the function βn(.) is always defined (or can be prolonged by
continuity) in 0 and 1. We will think of this as selecting a particular best-response. Symmetric
equilibria are characterized by the fixed points of the function βn on [0, 1]. There can be no fixed
point in 1 because βn(.) is bounded away from 1. If there is a fixed point in 0 we will disregard
it as long as there is another equilibrium. But if it is the only fixed point, our interpretation will
be that the best-response dynamics leads to the selection of this equilibrium where everybody
votes to select the issue. This convention avoids unnecessary discussions in the rest of the
paper. It does not affect the interpretation of our results, and we are generally interested in
situations with other fixed points than 0.
Proposition 2 (Equilibrium Characterization). In any equilibrium of the game, players use
threshold selection strategies such that ti < tnaive. In particular, equilibrium strategies are
essentially pure strategies11. There exists a symmetric equilibrium of this game, and these
equilibria are characterized by the fixed points of βn.
11That is, voters may be mixing at the threshold but nowhere else.
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Proof. See Appendix A.
Hence strategic voters are less conservative than naive voters and select issues even when
their expected payoff from the proposal is lower than that from the status quo.
The properties of these equilibria are tied to the ratio
Rn(t) ≡
Pr
(
Sn(t) ≥ nv − 1
)
Pr
(
Sn(t) ≥ nv
) ,
which measures the contribution of a voter to the probability that the proposal prevails in the
second round, conditional on her being pivotal in the first round. In the proof of Proposition 2
we derive a closed form expression of Rn which allows us to study the model numerically for any
particular type distribution F . Unfortunately, this expression is intractable for the derivation
of theoretical properties that apply to general type distributions. This problem can be solved
by taking n to the limit. Large deviation and saddlepoint approximation techniques from
statistics12 provide us with analytical tools to study the limit of Rn.
4 Alternative Rules
Sequential Procedures. Real world selection procedures often do not have the structure of
our basic simultaneous game. For example, in the case of petitions, the process of gathering
signatures is usually sequential. Dekel and Piccione (2000) showed that in symmetric binary
elections, the informative symmetric equilibria of the simultaneous voting game are also sequen-
tial equilibria of any sequential voting structure in a certain class. The selection stage of our
game is a symmetric binary election that falls in the scope of applications of the first theorem13
of Dekel and Piccione (2000). Therefore our equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous selection
12See Hollander (2000) for a general treatment of large deviations, or Dembo and Zeitouni (1998) for a more
advanced treatment; for saddlepoint approximation techniques, see Jensen (1995).
13That is up to the following detail: for notational convenience, Dekel and Piccione (2000) show their result
for a finite type space whereas our type space is the unit interval. The extension of their proof to this case is
immediate however.
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game applies to any sequential selection procedure in this class, which consists of all the games
with T < ∞ periods such that each voter is called to vote in some period, and voting may be
simultaneous in some periods. The calling order is known to the voters. A voter’s strategy is
then a function si(pi, h) of her private signal and the history of play at the time she is called
to vote. Then the first theorem of Dekel and Piccione (2000) implies the following result.
Proposition 3 (Sequential Selection Procedures). Pick any sequential selection game G in the
class described above. The following two statements are equivalent:
(i) The strategy σ(p) = 1p>t∗ defines a symmetric equilibrium of the simultaneous selection
game.
(ii) The irresponsive strategy s(p, h) = 1p>t∗ defines a symmetric sequential equilibrium of G.
The intuition is that when symmetric voters use a voting strategy that is independent of
history, the event that their vote is pivotal is identical in the simultaneous game and in any of
the sequential games.
Subcommittees. In some committees such as the United States Congress, issues are selected
within a subgroup of the voters. To describe this procedure we let S ∈ [0, 1] denote the size of
the subcommittee, with V ≤ S. nS ≡ dnSe is the number of voters in the subcommittee, and
ncS ≡ n−nS. Making the same assumptions about preferences and information, and considering
the voting decision of a member of the selecting committee, it is clear that, conditional on being
pivotal, and provided other players are using a threshold t, the random variable that describes
the belief of a player about the tally of votes that will finally be cast in favor of the proposal is
S˜n(t) = X1(t) + · · ·+XnV −1(t) +X1(t) + · · ·+XnS−nV (t) + X˜1 + · · ·+ X˜ncS ,
where X˜ is a generic Bernoulli random variable that takes the value 1 with probability p˜,
We can write the best response function of a voter to all other players playing with a common
threshold t.
13
β˜n(t) =
(
1 +
u+
u−
Pr
(
S˜n(t) ≥ nv − 1
)
Pr
(
S˜n(t) ≥ nv
) )−1 .
The following result is the analog of Proposition 2.
Proposition 4 (Equilibrium Characterization with a Subcommittee). In any equilibrium of
the game with a subcommittee, players use threshold selection strategies such that ti < tnaive.
In particular, equilibrium strategies are essentially pure strategies. There exists a symmetric
equilibrium of this game in which all players use the same threshold. The symmetric equilibria
of the game are characterized by the fixed points of β˜n.
5 Asymptotic Analysis
As already noted, the best response function βn(t) depends on the ratio Rn(t) =
Pr(Sn(t)≥nv−1)
Pr(Sn(t)≥nv)
and in order to study the asymptotic equilibria of the selection game, it is necessary to un-
derstand the asymptotic behavior of this ratio. The law of large numbers implies that both
probabilities converge to either 1 or 0. More specifically, letting m(t) ≡ limn→∞mn(t) =
V p(t) + (1− V )p(t), where mn(t) ≡ 1nE Sn(t) = nV −1n p(t) +
ncV
n
p(t), both probabilities converge
to 0 if the asymptotic mean of the sequence is less than the second round rule, m(t) < v, and
to 1 if m(t) ≥ v. Indeed, as the population becomes large, the fraction of the voters who, when
conditioning on the pivotal event, eventually support the proposal converges to m(t), and the
proposal is rejected if this fraction is below v. Since m(t) is strictly increasing in t, there is a
unique, if any, t˜ such that m(t) < v for every t < t˜, and m(t) > v for every t > t˜.
When both probabilities converge to 1, the ratio also converges to 1. When they converge
to 0, however, we need to know the speed of convergence of the two probabilities. We can apply
Ga¨rtner-Ellis theorem (see for example Hollander, 2000) to show that both probabilities are in
the order of e−Kn for some constant K (see Lemma 2). This is not sufficient to conclude and
characterizing the limit requires more work.
This section is technical and a reader who is not interested in this aspect may just read the
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first subsection to understand our notations and jump to Proposition 5 for the expression of
the asymptotic best-response function, and then to the remainder of the paper.
5.1 Notations and Preliminary Results
In order to state these results, we introduce some notations and well known results in statistics
(see Jensen, 1995). For the random variable Sn ∈ R defined on the probability space (Ω,A, P ),
and a scalar θ, the Laplace transform ϕn(θ) of Sn is defined by
ϕn(θ) ≡ E eθSn =
(
peθ + 1− p)nV −1 (peθ + 1− p)ncV ,
and its cumulant transform Kn(θ) by
Kn(θ) ≡ logϕn(θ) = (nV − 1) log
(
peθ + 1− p)+ ncV log (peθ + 1− p) .
The two transforms are defined on R, they are C∞, and Kn(.) is strictly convex.
The exponential family generated by Sn and the original probability measure P consists of
the tilted probability measures Pθ given by
dPθ
dP
(ω) = ϕn(θ)
−1eθSn(ω). (2)
With µn(θ) ≡ Eθ Sn and σn(θ) ≡
√
V arθ Sn respectively denoting the mean and standard
deviation under Pθ, we have the formulas
µn(θ) = K
′
n(θ), and σn(θ) =
√
K ′′n(θ).
The log likelihood function for estimating θ in the family {Pθ : θ ∈ R} is θx −Kn(θ), so that
the maximum likelihood estimator of θ solves the equation Eθ Sn = K
′
n(θ) = x.
Let θn be the unique solution of the equation K
′
n(θ) = nv, and θ
′
n the unique solution of
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the equation K ′n(θ) = nv − 1. In both cases, eθ is the unique positive root of a second degree
polynomial, and it is easy to see that limn→∞ θn = limn→∞ θ′n = θˆ, where θˆ is defined as the
solution of
κ′(θ) =
V peθ
peθ + 1− p +
(1− V )peθ
peθ + 1− p = v, (3)
with
κ(θ) ≡ lim
n→∞
Kn(θ)
n
= V log
(
peθ + 1− p)+ (1− V ) log (peθ + 1− p) .
θˆ can be written in closed form by solving for the only positive root of (3) in eθˆ. We write
eθˆ = Ψ(V, 1−V, v) where Ψ(α, β, γ) is defined as the unique positive root14 of the second degree
equation
α
pX
pX + 1− p + β
pX
pX + 1− p = γ, (4)
with α, β, γ ∈ (0, 1).
The second degree equations solved by eθn and eθ
′
n are
(Vn − 1/n) pX
pX + 1− p + (1− Vn)
pX
pX + 1− p = vn, (5)
and
(Vn − 1/n) pX
pX + 1− p + (1− Vn)
pX
pX + 1− p = vn − 1/n (6)
respectively. Therefore, eθn = Ψ(Vn − 1/n, 1− Vn, vn) and eθ′n = Ψ(Vn − 1/n, 1− Vn, vn − 1/n).
With this, we can prove the following lemma which will prove useful in the analysis since we
will show that the limit of the ratio Rn is a function of θˆ.
Lemma 1. The functions θn(t), θ
′
n(t) and θˆ(t) are all continuous and strictly decreasing in t.
θn(t) and θ
′
n(t) converge uniformly to θˆ(t) in O(1/n) on any compact K ⊆ (0, 1). Furthermore
θˆ is strictly decreasing in V and strictly increasing in v. Finally, if V > v, the uniform
convergence result holds on any compact K ⊂ [0, 1).
14This root exists as long as α + β > γ which will always be true for the cases we are interested in, at least
for n sufficiently high.
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Proof. See Appendix B
5.2 Asymptotic Equilibria
We start with standard large deviation results about the tail probabilities of interest. The first
parts of points (i) and (ii) in the following lemma are implied by the law of large numbers, the
second parts are consequences of the large deviation principle, and in particular of Ga¨rtner-Ellis
Theorem.
Lemma 2.
(i) For every t < t˜, and αn ∈ {nv − 1, nv}
lim
n→∞
Pr
(
Sn(t) ≥ αn
)
= 0.
Furthermore
lim
n→∞
1
n
log Pr
(
Sn(t) ≥ αn
)
= −
(
vθˆ(t)− κ(θˆ(t))) < 0. (7)
(ii) For every t ≥ t˜, and αn ∈ {nv − 1, nv},
lim
n→∞
Pr
(
Sn(t) ≥ αn
)
= 1.
Furthermore, for every t > t˜,
lim
n→∞
1
n
log
(
1− Pr(Sn(t) ≥ αn)) = −(v∣∣θˆ(t)∣∣− κ(∣∣θˆ(t)∣∣)) < 0 (8)
Proof. See Appendix B
The lemma implies that the ratio Rn converges to 1 when t ≥ t˜. The two probabilities
of interest converge to 0 at the same speed in the other case. Although this does not allow
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us to make any conclusion at this stage, it shows that the probabilities on which the voters’
equilibrium calculations are based converge exponentially fast to 0 or 1.
We start by providing new expressions for the tail probabilities of the form Pr
(
Sn ≥ αn
)
where αn is a sequence of integers, keeping in mind that we will be interested in αn = nv and
αn = nv − 1. To obtain these expressions, we use the exponentially tilted measures Pθ. The
following results are adapted from Jensen (1995, Section 1.4).
Lemma 3. For any αn ∈ Z, and any θ > 0 we have
Pr
(
Sn ≥ αn
)
=
ϕn(θ)e
−θαn
σn(θ) (1− e−θ)
∑
z≥αn, z∈Z
(1− e−θ)σn(θ)e−θ(z−αn)Pθ
(
Sn = z
)
. (9)
Proof. See Appendix B.
We can express the sum in (9) as an inversion integral over the appropriate characteristic
function. In order to do that, we need the following inversion formula that can be found in
Jensen (1995, theorem 1.2.4), or in Feller (1971, Section XV.3) for a proof.
Lemma 4 (Inversion Formula). Let X be a lattice distribution concentrated on Z with maximal
step 1. Let
γ(s) ≡ E eisX =
∑
x∈Z
eisxP (X = x),
be the characteristic function of X. For any x ∈ Z we have the inversion formula
P (X = x) = (2pi)−1
∫ pi
−pi
e−isxγ(s) ds. (10)
With this, we can prove the following result.
Lemma 5. The sum in (9) can be written as
(2pi)−1
∫
In(θ)
ϕθ
(
s
σn(θ)
)
J
(
θ,
s
σn(θ)
)
eis(µn(θ)−αn)/σn(θ)
1 + is
θσn(θ)
ds (11)
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where
J(θ, z) ≡ 1 + iz/θ
1 + e
−θ
1−e−θ (1− e−iz)
,
ϕθ(z) ≡ ϕn(θ + iz)
ϕn(θ)
e−izµn(θ),
and In(θ) ≡
[−piσn(θ), piσn(θ)].
Proof. See Appendix B.
Now using (9) and (11) evaluated at θ = θ′n to express Pr (Sn ≥ nv − 1), and at θ = θn to
express Pr (Sn ≥ nv) we obtain the following expression for Rn on
[
0, t˜
]
Rn =
ϕn(θ′n)e−(nv−1)θ
′
n
σn(θ′n)(1−e−θ′n )
ϕn(θn)e−nvθn
σn(θn)(1−e−θn )
×
∫
In(θ′n)
ϕθ′n
(
s
σn(θ′n)
)
J
(
θ′n,
s
σn(θ′n)
)
1
1+ is
θ′nσn(θ′n)
ds∫
In(θn)
ϕθn
(
s
σn(θn)
)
J
(
θn,
s
σn(θn)
)
1
1+ is
θnσn(θn)
ds
, (12)
where we used the identities µn(θn) = nv and µn(θ
′
n) = nv − 1 to simplify under the integral.
Since θn and θ
′
n both converge to θˆ, it is possible to show that the first fraction converges to e
θˆ.
This is the easier part of the proof, although we need to show that θn− θ′n goes to 0 faster than
1/n. The technical part of the proof is to show that the second fraction converges to 1. In order
to do that, we need to approximate the integrals as n goes to infinity. Consider the integral at
the denominator for example. We can approximate ϕθn(s/σn(θn)), which is the characteristic
function of the normalized random variable (Sn − nv)/σn(θn) under the exponentially tilted
probability Pθn , by e
−s2/2 which is the characteristic function of a standard normal distribu-
tion. This is the usual intuition of central limit theorems which say that the distribution of
a standardized random variable is asymptotically normal. The term J(θn, s/σn(θn)) can be
approximated by 1, and we are left with the approximation
e−
s2
2
1
1 + is
θnσn(θn)
19
under the integral sign. Finally, since σn(θn)→∞ as n→∞, we are left with the integral
B0(λ) =
∫ +∞
−∞
e−
s2
2
1
1 + is
λ
ds,
where λ = θnσn(θn). B0(λ) is a well studied function that is known to converge to (2pi)
1/2
as λ → ∞ (see Jensen, 1995, section 2.1). Doing the same calculation for the integral at the
numerator gives the result15.
The proof follows the big lines of Jensen (1995) with the additional difficulty that we need
to show that the convergence is uniform in t. In fact, we adapt the proof of Jensen (1995) to
show the convergence below t˜, we use G artner-Ellis theorem above t˜, and we build a separate
argument to understand asymptotic behavior in the neighborhood of t˜.
Proposition 5 (Convergence of the Best-Responses). The best-response functions βn converge
pointwise to
β(t) ≡
(
1 +
u+
u−
ρ(t)
)−1
,
where
ρ(t) ≡
 e
θˆ(t) if t < t˜
1 if t ≥ t˜
The convergence is uniform on any compact K ⊂ (0, 1], and if V > v, it is uniform on [0, 1].
Furthermore, the function β(t) is continuous on [0, 1] and strictly increasing in t on [0, t˜]. It
is decreasing in v and increasing in V . Finally, if V ′ > V , then for every t ∈ (0, t˜(V, v)),
β(t;V ′, v) > β(t;V, v).
Proof. See Appendix B
The fact that β(.) is strictly increasing in t can be interpreted as a form of strategic com-
plementarities between voters: when all other players increase their common threshold, a voter
best responds by increasing her threshold as well. The uniform convergence is needed to ensure
15This is an oversimplified account, but it has the merit of outlining the main steps of the proof.
20
that the fixed points of β(.) are the limits of the fixed points of βn(.). The set of asymptotic
equilibria is the set of fixed points of β(.). Let T ∗ = {t ∈ [0, 1] : β(t) = t} be this set. The con-
tinuity of βn(.) and β(.) implies that T
∗
n and T
∗ are closed sets. Since they are also bounded,
we can define the distance to these sets, d(t, A) ≡ supt′∈A
∣∣t− t′∣∣ for any compact set A.
Proposition 6.
(i) 0 ∈ T ∗ ⇔ V ≤ v.
(ii) If t∞ is the limit point of a sequence {tn} such that tn ∈ T ∗n , then t∞ ∈ T ∗.
(iii) For every δ > 0, there exists some N such that for every n > N , tn ∈ T ∗n implies that
d(tn, T
∗) < δ.
(iv) If t∗ ∈ T ∗ is such that β(t) crosses the 45◦-line at t∗, then there exists {tn} such that
tn ∈ T ∗n and limn→∞ tn = t∗.
Proof. See Appendix B
5.3 Uniqueness
Equilibria are not unique in general. It can be shown that the uniform distribution f(t) = 1
has at most one equilibrium that is not 0. The next example shows that there can be multiple
non null equilibria as well.
Example 1 (Multiple Equilibria). Consider the distribution of preferences f defined by
f(x) =

γ(1/4− x+ 10−5)− 1011 if 0 ≤ x ≤ 0.25
γ(−1/4 + x+ 10−5)− 1011 if 0.25 < x ≤ 0.5
γ(3/4− x+ 10−5)− 1011 if 0.5 < x ≤ 0.75
γ(x− 3/4 + 10−5)− 1011 if 0.75 < x ≤ 1
(13)
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Figure 1: An Example with Multiple Equilibria
(a) The Density Function (b) The Best-Response Functions
where γ is chosen to make the surface under f(.) equal to 1. In Figure 1, we represented
the corresponding asymptotic best-response functions for V = 0.6, and v = 0.65 showing the
multiplicity of equilibria. Note that there are multiple stable equilibria as well.
5.4 Effects of the Rules
The simple form of the asymptotic best-response function enables us to study the effects of
the voting rules. In order to do that, we use the following partial order on subsets of R: for
every S, T ⊂ R, S < T if and only if inf S ≤ inf T and supS ≤ supT , with at least one of
the inequalities holding strictly. The following proposition is a corollary of Proposition 5 which
says how the best-response function varies with the rules. We look at the set of equilibria as
the image of a function T ∗ : [0, 1]2 → 2[0,1] from the set of voting rules to the subsets of [0, 1].
Proposition 7 (Effects of the Rules). T ∗(v, V ) is increasing in V and decreasing in v. That
is the extremal equilibrium thresholds are increasing with the selection rule and decreasing with
the decision rule. Furthermore, if for V 6= V ′, supT ∗(v, V ) = supT ∗(v, V ′) then they are both
greater than t˜ and equal to tnaive. The same is true if for v 6= v′, supT ∗(v, V ) = supT ∗(v′, V ).
Proof. Given the sense of variation of β with respect to v and V , the results follow from Milgrom
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and Roberts (1994, Corollary 1).
Hence equilibrium selection thresholds increase with the selection rule and decrease with
the decision rule. The latter result is not very surprising: the harder it is for the proposal
to pass the second round, the more willing voters are to bring the issue to the ballot. The
first statement may seem more surprising: the more difficult the institution makes it for an
issue to be selected, the more selective the voters. In other words, they fail to offset the effect
of the selection rule, and accentuate it instead. Suppose for example that the voters always
play according to the maximal stable equilibrium threshold (this is the threshold they would
converge to if they used a collective learning procedure initialized at the naive threshold). Then
the fraction of votes cast in favor of selection16 decreases as the tally of votes needed to select the
issue increases. Note that conditional on being pivotal, selecting an issue when the selection
rule is more stringent means that the proposal is more likely to pass. But because a voter
keeps the option of voting against the proposal when she selects an issue, the driving force is
more subtle. What matters to a voter is the difference in the probability that the proposal
eventually passes, conditionally on being pivotal at the selection stage, whether she eventually
supports it or not. A more stringent selection rule, makes it relatively more likely that the issue
passes when the voter eventually doesn’t support it compared to when she does. In order to
compensate for that, the voter becomes more selective.
With Proposition 6, we can extend the comparative statics to large but finite committees.
Proposition 8. For every V, V ′, v, v′ with v ≤ v′ and V ≤ V ′, there exists N such that for
n ≥ N we have
supT ∗(V, v) > supT ∗(V ′, v) ⇒ supT ∗n(V, v) > supT ∗n(V ′, v),
and
supT ∗(V, v) > supT ∗(V, v′) ⇒ supT ∗n(V, v) > supT ∗n(V, v′),
16This fraction is 1− F (t∗) with a large population.
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Proof. See Appendix B
A similar argument can be made about the lowest fixed points. When the highest fixed points
are equal, they are equal to tnaive and then for almost every V < V
′, limn→∞ supT ∗n(V, v) =
limn→∞ supT ∗n(V
′, v) = tnaive.
Example 2 (Comparative Statics with the Uniform Distribution). With the closed form expres-
sions of the best-response function for finite committees obtained in the proof of Proposition 2,
we can study the equilibria of the finite game for particular distributions. In this section, we
illustrate our results for the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. Figure 2 shows the convergence of
the best-response functions; Figure 3 illustrates the comparative statics on the selection rule in
the limit; Figure 4 shows the same comparative statics for n = 9; finally, Figure 5 shows how
the selection threshold and the selection probability vary with the selection rule for n = 9.
Our comparative statics result is only proved to hold for large committees, but numerical
analyses suggest that it may hold irrespective of the size of the committee. Figure 4 illustrates
this for the uniform distribution, but we have also run numerical analyses for many distributions
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in the classes of Beta and triangular distributions without ever invalidating the result.
5.5 Selection in Subcommittees
It is straightforward (but long) to transpose the asymptotic analysis of the basic model to the
case of subcommittees. Let θ˜(t) be such that eθ˜(t) is the unique solution on (1,+∞) of the
following equation in X
V pX
pX + 1− p +
(S − V )pX
pX + 1− p +
(1− S)p˜X
p˜X + 1− p˜ = v, (14)
Let ˜˜t be the unique (if any) t that solves V p(t) + (S − V )p(t) + (1− S)p˜ = v. Then
Proposition 9 (Convergence of the Best-Responses with Subcommittees). The best-response
functions β˜n converges uniformly on [0, 1] to
β˜(t) =
(
1 +
u+
u−
ρ˜(t)
)−1
,
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where
ρ˜(t) =
 e
θ˜(t) if t < ˜˜t
1 if t ≥ ˜˜t
The convergence is uniform on any compact K ⊂ (0, 1], and if V + 1− S > v, it is uniform on
[0, 1]. Furthermore, the function β˜(t) is continuous on [0, 1] and strictly increasing in t on
[
0, ˜˜t
]
.
It is decreasing in v and increasing in V . Finally, if V ′ > V , then for every t ∈ (0, ˜˜t(V, v)),
β˜(t;V ′, v) > β˜(t;V, v).
And, letting T ∗S denote the set of equilibria with subcommittees.
Proposition 10 (Effect of the Rules with Subcommittees). T ∗S(v, V ) is increasing in V and
decreasing in v. That is the extremal equilibrium thresholds are increasing with the selection rule
and decreasing with the decision rule. Furthermore, for any rule (v, V ), T ∗S(v, V ) ≥ T ∗(v, V ).
Proof. The only point that needs a proof is the last one. For that we just need to compare
(3) and (14), and notice that since for every t, p(t) ≤ p˜, it must be true that eθ˜(t) ≤ eθˆ(t), and
finally that β˜(t) ≥ β(t) which concludes the proof.
6 Welfare Analysis
So far we haven’t tried to answer the question of why selection rules exist, or which rules should
be used. In fact, they are useless in the current framework. The optimal voting rule from a
utilitarian perspective is to allow every possible issue to be selected by choosing V = 0, which
is equivalent to suppressing the selection stage altogether, and to set v = u−/(u−+u+) so that
the proposal is adopted if and only if the expected utility gain of its supporters is higher than
the expected utility loss of its opponents.
The use of selection rules cannot be justified without positing a cost of running the final
round. Then there may be some gains in screening issues that cannot make it anyway. This
cost may be the cost of gathering more information about the issue in order to formulate a
27
proposal, or just the opportunity cost of dealing with an issue rather than an other for an
institution with limited time. In the case of citizens’ initiatives, it is the cost to organize a
referendum. In what follows, we simply assume a fixed cost c to organize the final election. We
assume a large population and conduct the analysis at the limit. We also focus on a particular
equilibrium of the selection game: the highest stable equilibrium threshold. A possible justi-
fication for selecting this particular equilibrium is that it is the threshold to which a simple
collective learning heuristics converges when initiated at the naive threshold. Let t∗ denote this
equilibrium threshold in what follows. It depends on the voting rules and on the distribution
that characterizes the issue at stake.
6.1 Single Issue
We start by assuming that there is a single issue, or equivalently that all the issues that the
institution may face are characterized by the same distribution and the same expected payoffs
u+ and u−.
At the limit, the law of large numbers implies that the fraction of the population that
eventually supports (and votes for) the proposal is exactly p˜, and the fraction of the population
that votes to select the issue is 1− F (t∗). Then the program of an institution designer with a
uniformly weighted utilitarian criterion is
max
(V,v)
(
1p˜≥v
(
p˜u+ − (1− p˜)u−)− c)11−F (t∗F (V,v))≥V . (15)
The problem that the selection rule must solve is therefore to screen issues such that p˜u+−
(1 − p˜)u− < c. If it is successful at doing so, the decision rule can be chosen anywhere in[
0, u
−+c
u−+u+
]
. Note that the optimal v in the absence of a selection stage, v = u
−
u−+u+ , lies in that
interval. For now, we pick some v anywhere in that interval. An issue is selected if and only
if t∗F (V, v) ≤ F−1(1 − V ). Because the left-hand side is strictly increasing in V and bounded
between 0 and u
−
u−+u+ , and the right-hand side is strictly decreasing in V and equal to 1 at
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V = 0 and to 0 at V = 1, it is easy to see that there is a unique V˜F (v) ∈ (0, 1) such that
the issue is always selected when V ≤ V˜F (v), and never selected otherwise. This leads to the
following characterization of optimal rules.
Proposition 11 (Optimal Rules with a Single Issue).
(i) With a single issue such that p˜F ≥ u−+cu−+u+ , any rule such that v ≤ u
−+c
u−+u+ and V ≤ V˜F (v)
is optimal.
(ii) With a single issue such that p˜F ≤ u−+cu−+u+ , any rule such that V > V˜F (v) is optimal.
6.2 Multiple Issues
Suppose now that the committee can face different issues from a finite set I = {1, . . . , I}
indexed by ι. Each issue is characterized by a distribution Fι and payoff parameters u
−
ι , u
+
ι , cι.
Note that the index ι is for the issues and not the voters. We allow the cost of organizing the
final vote to depend on the particular issue. Let λι ≡ u−ι +cιu−ι +u+ι . For each issue and each decision
rule v there is a unique V˜ι(v) ≡ V˜Fι(v) defined as in the single-issue case such that the issue ι
is selected if and only if V ≤ V˜ι(v). Finally, let p˜ι denote the mean of Fι.
With these notations, we can define the set of issues that are optimally selected I+ ≡ {ι|p˜ι ≥
λi}, and the set of issues that are optimally screened I− ≡ {ι|p˜ι ≤ λi}. We say that a rule
achieves perfect discrimination if it selects every issue in I+ and none other.
And for any decision rule v, let V˜ +(v) ≡ minι∈I+ V˜ι(v), and V˜ −(v) ≡ maxι∈I− V˜ι. For a
given v, V˜ +(v) is the highest possible selection rule that selects every issue in I+, and V˜ −(v)
is the lowest possible selection rule that screens every issue in I−. The following proposition is
a direct consequence of the single-issue case.
Proposition 12 (Perfectly Discriminating Rules with Multiple Issues).
(i) If there exists some v∗ ≤ minI+ λι such that V˜ − (v∗) ≤ V˜ + (v∗), then any voting procedure
(V ∗, v∗) such that V˜ − (v∗) ≤ V ∗ ≤ V˜ + (v∗) achieves perfect discrimination and is therefore
optimal.
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(ii) If for every v ≤ minI+ λι, V˜ − (v) > V˜ + (v), there is no voting procedure that achieves
perfect discrimination.
In case (ii), any voting procedure is bound to generate type I and type II errors even though
we conducted the analysis at the limit in the size of the committee where there is no uncertainty
about which issues should be selected and which issues should be screened. This result suggests
an explanation for why certain institutions may use different rules for different types of issues.
To characterize the optimal rules in case (ii), more structure is needed so that type I errors can
be weighed against type II errors.
7 Final Remarks
We have developed a model of issue selection in committees which predicts that voters are more
conservative when the selection rule is more stringent. The decision rule has the opposite effect.
Our results rely on the assumptions that voters are uncertain about their own final preferences
at the selection stage, and their preferences are independent. It would naturally be interesting
to understand how correlations in preferences would affect our results, but this question poses
considerable technical difficulties and it is left for future research.
Under favorable identification conditions, our results could be tested directly. However, the
rules of these institutions rarely change, if at all. For the case of the Supreme Court, as for other
major institutions, the continuation of the rules is usually interpreted as a guarantee of credi-
bility. Finding an identification strategy to test our predictions on “established” committees is
a stimulating direction for future research. Our model may also have normative applications.
Indeed, we derive efficient selection and decision rules that depend on the costs of organizing
elections. As such, we provide a rationale for the choice of an agenda-setting procedure for
emerging or established institutions that have no explicit rules, such as the Committee of Per-
manent representatives of the European Union. Our results can also be used for the choice
of rules for citizens’ initiatives, a procedure that has recently been introduced or extended in
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several European countries. The wide variety of committees that use, or could use, selection
rules calls for a better understanding of their effect, and offers several potential applications for
this research.
Appendix A Proof of the Equilibrium Characterization
Proof of Proposition 2: Equilibrium Characterization. The expected utility of voter i
if the issue is selected, conditional on the event Ei that her vote is pivotal, is given by E (Ui|Ei),
which is of the form (Ai +Bi)pi −Bi, where
Ai = u
+E
 ∑
C⊆Ni
#C≥nv−1
∏
j∈C
pj
∏
l∈NirC
(1− pl)
∣∣∣Ei
 > 0,
and
Bi = u
−E
 ∑
C⊆Ni
#C≥nv
∏
j∈C
pj
∏
l∈NirC
(1− pl)
∣∣∣Ei
 > 0.
i selects the issue if this expression is greater than 0, that is if pi > ti = Bi/(Ai + Bi). Clearly
Bi/u
− < Ai/u+ implying ti = Bi/(Ai +Bi) < u−/(u− + u+).
In a symmetric equilibrium, all the voters use the same threshold t, and Ei is the event that
exactly nV − 1 voters in Ni have a type p above t. The expected value of their type is then
that is p(t), while for the ncV other voters in Ni, it is p(t). Because the types are independent,
A and B can be written as follows, where the subscript i is no longer needed because of the
symmetry,
A = u+
n−1∑
s=nv−1
∑
j+l=s
j≤nV −1
l≤ncV
(
nV − 1
j
)(
ncV
l
)
p(t)j(1−p(t))nV −1−jp(t)l(1−p(t))ncV −l = Pr(Sn(t) ≥ nv−1)u+,
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and
B = u−
n−1∑
s=nv
∑
j+l=s
j≤nV −1
l≤ncV
(
nV − 1
j
)(
ncV
l
)
p(t)j(1−p(t))nV −1−jp(t)l(1−p(t))ncV −l = Pr(Sn(t) ≥ nv)u−.
And in the summation term, we can recognize the probability mass function of the random
variable Sn(t) which gives the tally of votes eventually cast by other voters in favor of the
proposal given a pivotal voter’s information. Then the best response function of this voter is
given by βn(t), and the symmetric equilibria of the game are the fixed points of βn.
The expressions of A and B imply the continuity of βn and, since βn maps the unit interval
to itself, Brouwer’s fixed point theorem implies the existence of a symmetric equilibrium.
Appendix B Proofs for the Asymptotic Analysis
We start by providing the inversion formula for continuous distributions without proof, it is
the continuous analog of Lemma 4 and a well known result17. Then we prove three additional
lemmas which are useful for the main proofs. Some of these proofs use results from Lemma 1,
which was stated in the main body of the paper and is proved below.
Lemma 6 (Inversion Formula for Continuous Distributions). Let X be a real random variable
with a density function g(x) on R. Let
γ(s) ≡ E eisX =
∫
R
eisxg(x)dx,
be its characteristic function. Then for any x ∈ R we have the inversion formula
g(x) = (2pi)−1
∫ pi
−pi
e−isxγ(s)ds.
17See Jensen (1995) or Feller (1971)
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Lemma 7. For every compact K ⊂ (0, 1) (or K ⊂ [0, 1) if V > v), there exist positive constants
cσ, Cσ > 0 such that for every n sufficiently large and every t ∈ K, we have
cσ
√
n ≤ min{σn(θn(t)), σn(θ′n(t))} ≤ max{σn(θn(t)), σn(θ′n(t))} ≤ Cσ√n.
Proof. The definition of σn implies that for any θ
σn(θ)√
n
=
{
(Vn − 1/n) p(t)(1− p(t))eθ
(p(t)eθ + 1− p(t))2 +
(1− Vn) p(t)(1− p(t))eθ(
p(t)eθ + 1− p(t))2
}1/2
.
By Lemma 1 (see the proof of this lemma for more precision), we can bound θn(t) and θ
′
n(t)
upward and downward by the same values θ and θ for every t ∈ K and every n sufficiently
large. Since p and p are increasing in t, we can write that for every t ∈ K
{
(Vn − 1/n) p˜eθ
}1/2
1− p˜+ eθ ≤
σn(θn(t))√
n
≤ eθ/2
{
(Vn − 1/n)
(p˜eθ)2
+
(1− Vn) p˜
(1− p˜+ eθ)2
}1/2
.
Because the right hand-side and the left hand-side both converge to finite and strictly positive
real numbers, we can conclude for θn. We can write the same for θ
′
n.
Lemma 8. For every compact K ⊂ (0, 1) (or K ⊂ [0, 1) if V > v), there exist positive constants
C ≤ cσ and κ such that for every s ∈ [−C
√
n,C
√
n], every t ∈ K, and every n sufficiently
large we have ∣∣∣∣ϕθn ( sσn(θn)
)
− e− s
2
2
∣∣∣∣ ≤ κ6c3σn1/2 |s|3 exp
(
−s
2
4
)
.
Proof. Consider the complex valued function κn(s) =
1
n
logϕθn(s/σn(θn)). We will expand it in
s to prove the result. For that, we start by writing
κn(s) = (Vn − 1/n) log
(
p exp (θ + is/σ) + 1− p
p exp (θn) + 1− p
)
+(1− Vn) log
(
p exp (θ + is/σ) + 1− p
p exp (θn) + 1− p
)
−iµs/σ,
where we use the notations σ for σn(θn), θ for θn and µ for µn(θn) = nv. Then the first and
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second derivatives are
κ′n(s) =
i
σ
(
(Vn − 1/n) p exp (θ + is/σ)
p exp (θ + is/σ) + 1− p + (1− Vn)
p exp (θ + is/σ)
p exp (θ + is/σ) + 1− p − µ
)
,
and
κ′′n(s) =
(
i
σ
)2(
(Vn − 1/n) p(1− p) exp (θ + is/σ)
(p exp (θ + is/σ) + 1− p)2 + (1− Vn)
p(1− p) exp (θ + is/σ)(
p exp (θ + is/σ) + 1− p)2
)
.
By construction, we have κ′n(0) = 0 and κ
′′
n(0) = −1/n. An elementary proof by induction
shows that for k ≥ 2 we can write
κ(k)n (s) =
(
i
σ
)k(
(Vn − 1/n)
Qk
(
exp (θ + is/σ)
)
(p exp (θ + is/σ) + 1− p)k + (1− Vn)
Q
k
(
exp (θ + is/σ)
)(
p exp (θ + is/σ) + 1− p)k
)
,
where Qk and Qk are polynomials of degree k − 1 whose coefficients are polynomials in p and
p respectively. For a polynomial P (X), we let |P |(X) be the polynomial whose coefficients
are the norms of the coefficients of P (X). Then we can bound κ
(k)
n (s) upward on any interval
I = [−Aσpi,Aσpi] with A < 1 by
κk(t) =
(
1
σ
)k(∣∣Qk∣∣(eθ)
mk
+
∣∣Q
k
∣∣(eθ)
mk
)
,
where
m = min
z∈[−Api,Api]
∣∣peθ+iz + (1− p)∣∣ > 0,
and
m = min
z∈[−Api,Api]
∣∣peθ+iz + (1− p)∣∣ > 0.
The dependency of κk on t comes through θ = θn(t), σ = σn(θn(t)), p(t) and p(t). In particular,
we have shown that κ
(3)
n (s) is Lipschitz-continuous on I = [−Aσpi,Aσpi] since its derivative
is uniformly bounded on I. This in turn implies that κ
(3)
n (s) is absolutely continuous so that
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for every s ∈ I, by the fundamental theorem of calculus,we can write the following Taylor
expansion for κn(s)
κn(s) = − s
2
2n
+
∫ s
0
κ
(3)
n (u)
2
(s− u)2du.
And using Lemma 7 to bound σ, this leads to
∣∣∣∣κn(s) + s22n
∣∣∣∣ ≤ κ36c3σn3/2 |s|3 .
Remark that κ3 is continuous in t on K so that we can define κ ≡ maxt∈K κ3 and replace κ3 by
κ in the expression above. Hence we can write that
ϕθn
(
s
σn
(
θn(t)
)) = exp(−s2
2
+
κ
6c3σn
1/2
|s|3 ω
)
,
where ω is some complex number with norm less than or equal to 1. Then we can use the
following inequality which is a particular case of an inequality from Feller (1971, p.535) and
holds for any λ ∈ C ∣∣eλ − 1∣∣ ≤ |λ| e|λ|.
With λ = κ
6c3σn
1/2 |s|3 ω, we obtain
∣∣∣∣ϕθn ( sσn(θn)
)
− e− s
2
2
∣∣∣∣ ≤ κ6c3σn1/2 |s|3 exp
(
−s
2
4
)
exp
(
−s
2
4
+
κ
6c3σn
1/2
|s|3
)
.
And for |s| ≤ cn 12 with c = 3c3σ
2κ
, the second exponential term is bounded upward by 1. Fixing
some A > 1 and choosing
C ≡ min {c, Acσpi} ,
we have shown that for every s such that |s| ≤ C√n, every t ∈ K, and n sufficiently large
∣∣∣∣ϕθn ( sσn(θn)
)
− e− s
2
2
∣∣∣∣ ≤ κ6c3σn1/2 |s|3 exp
(
−s
2
4
)
.
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For the next two lemmas let γ(u) ≡ E eiuSn be the characteristic function of Sn. Then
γ˜
(
u
sn
)
≡ γ
(
u
sn
)
e−
iunmn
sn , with mn(t) =
1
n
E Sn(t) and sn(t) =
√
V arSn(t), is the characteristic
function of the standardized random variable Zn(t) ≡ Sn(t)−nmn(t)sn(t) .
Lemma 9. There exist positive constants cs, Cs such that for n sufficiently large and every
t ∈ [0, 1]
cs <
sn
n1/2
< Cs.
Proof. This is because
s2n
n
= (Vn − 1/n)p(t)(1− p(t)) + (1− Vn)p(t)(1− p(t))
converges uniformly on [0, 1] to V p(t)(1− p(t)) + (1− V )p(t)(1− p(t)) > 0.
Lemma 10. There exist positive constants C ′ ≤ cs
√
n and k such that for every u ∈ [−C ′√n,C ′√n],
every t ∈ [0, 1], and n sufficiently large we have
∣∣∣∣γ˜ ( usn(t)
)
− e−u
2
2
∣∣∣∣ ≤ k6c3sn1/2 |u|3 exp
(
−u
2
4
)
.
Proof. The proof is essentially the same as for Lemma 8 and we do not write it down to save
space.
Proof of Lemma 1: Convergence of θn and θ
′
n. Let k = supK < 1 and k = inf K > 0.
The functions p(t), p(t), 1−p(t) and 1−p(t) are all continuous on [0, 1] and bounded downward
by 0 and upward by 1. Since p and p are increasing in t, it is easy to see on (4) that θˆ, θn
and θ′n are all decreasing in t. Letting ψˆ = e
θˆ, and ψn = e
θn and ψ′n = e
θ′n , we have that, for
every t ∈ K, ψn(k) ≤ ψn(t), ψ′n(t) ≤ ψn(k). Because the function Ψ(.) is continuous, ψn and
ψ′n converge pointwise to ψˆ, and this implies that for n sufficiently large, ψn(k), ψ
′
n(k) ≤ 2ψˆ(k)
and ψn(k), ψ
′
n(k) ≥ ψˆ(k)/2. Letting θ = log(ψˆ(1)/2) and θ = log(2ψˆ(0)), we have shown that
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for n sufficiently large, the functions θn(t), θ
′
n(t) and θˆ(t) are uniformly bounded downward and
upward by (respectively) θ and θ.
Then using the closed form expressions of θn and θˆ, and the inequality | log x − log y| ≤
maxy≤z≤x(z−1)× |x− y|, we have, for n sufficiently large and every t ∈ K,
∣∣∣θˆ(t)− θn(t)∣∣∣ ≤ e−θ∣∣∣Ψ(V, 1− V, v; t)−Ψ(Vn − 1/n, 1− Vn, vn; t)∣∣∣
Now Ψ ≡ Ψ(V, 1− V, v; t) and Ψn ≡ Ψ(Vn − 1/n, 1− Vn, vn; t) respectively solve the equations
aΨ2 + bΨ + c = 0 (16)
and
anΨ
2
n + bnΨn + cn = 0 (17)
with a = vpp, b = (V − v)p(1 − p) + (1 − V − v)p(1 − p), c = −v(1 − p)(1 − p), an = vnpp,
bn = (Vn− 1/n− vn)p(1− p) + (1− Vn− vn)p(1− p), and cn = −vn(1− p)(1− p). Substracting
(17) to (16), we obtain with some algebra
|Ψ−Ψn| = |(an − a)Ψ
2
n + (bn − b)Ψn + (cn − c)|
|b+ a(Ψ + Ψn)| .
The term at the numerator is bounded upward uniformly in t by
|vn − v| e2θ + 2
(|Vn − V |+ |v − vn|)eθ + |vn − v| .
The term at the denominator is bounded downward by
M(t) = max
(|b| − |a| · |Ψ + Ψn| , |a| · |Ψ + Ψn| − |b|).
We can write that |b| − |a| · |Ψ + Ψn| ≥ |b| − 2 |a| eθ and |a| · |Ψ + Ψn| − |b| ≥ 2 |a| eθ − |b|.
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Hence for every t ∈ [0, 1], M(t) ≥ m(t) = max(|b| − 2 |a| eθ , 2 |a| eθ − |b|). But then m(t) is
continuous on the compact K and therefore attains its minimum m ≥ 0. If m = 0, there must
exist some t such that |b(t)| = 2|a(t)|eθ = 2|a(t)|eθ. This is possible if and only if a(t) = 0, that
is if t = 0 /∈ K, a contradiction. Therefore m > 0, and we can write
|Ψ−Ψn| ≤ m−1
(
|vn − v| e2θ + 2
(|Vn − V |+ |v − vn|)eθ + |vn − v|) , (18)
where the right-hand side converges to 0 in O(1/n) and is independent of t.
If V > v, then θˆ(0) is finite and we can extend the reasoning above to compacts that include
0. To see that θˆ(0) is finite, suppose that limt→0 θˆ(t) =∞. Then if we take the limit of (4) as
t→ 0 with (α, β, γ) = (V, 1− V, v), we obtain that
lim
t→0
p(t)eθˆ(t) =
v − V
1− v ,
but this is only possible if V ≤ v because p(t)eθˆ(t) is positive for every t.
For the sense of variation of θˆ(t), note that p and p are both strictly increasing in t, implying
that the functions 1−p
p
and
1−p
p
are strictly decreasing in t. Writing that
V
e−θˆ + 1−p
p
+
1− V
e−θˆ +
1−p
p
= v, (19)
shows that θˆ must be strictly decreasing in t. This also gives us the sense of variation with
respect to v. The senses of variation of θn and θ
′
n are obtained similarly. The continuity of each
of these three functions is proved by examination of their closed form expressions.
For the sense of variation with respect to V , we notice that θˆ is continuously differentiable
with respect to V by looking at its closed form expression, and proceed to differentiate (19)
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with respect to V yielding
dV
 11 + p
1−pe
−θˆ −
1
1 +
p
1−pe
−θˆ
+ e−θˆdθˆ
 V(1 + p
1−pe
−θˆ
)2 + 1− V(
1 +
p
1−pe
−θˆ
)2
 = 0,
implying that sign
(
dθˆ
dV
)
= sign
(
1
1+
p
1−p e
−θˆ − 11+ p
1−p e
−θˆ
)
= −1 as p > p.
Proof of Lemma 2: Convergence of the Tail Probabilities. The first part of point (i)
and point (ii) are immediate consequences of the strong law of large numbers which states that
for every ε, δ > 0, there is some Nε,δ such that for every n > Nε,δ,
Pr
( |Sn −mn|
n
< ε
)
> 1− δ.
Indeed, we can write
Pr
(
Sn(t) ≥ nv
)
= Pr
(
Sn −mn
n
≥ nv −mn
n
)
,
and since mn/n → m and nv/n → v, for any η > 0, there is some Nη such that, for every
n > Nη,
v −m− η < nv −mn
n
< v −m+ η.
Then,
Pr
(
Sn −mn
n
> v −m+ η
)
< Pr
(
Sn(t) ≥ nv
)
< Pr
(
Sn −mn
n
> v −m− η
)
.
If v > m, we can choose η such that, for a given small ε, v −m− η > ε. But then, for any
δ > 0 and n > max (Nη, Nε,δ),
Pr
(
Sn(t) ≥ nv
)
< Pr
(
Sn −mn
n
> v −m− η
)
< Pr
(
Sn −mn
n
> ε
)
< 1−Pr
( |Sn −mn|
n
< ε
)
< δ,
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which proves that Pr
(
Sn(t) ≥ nv
) → 0 when m < v. The arguments for m ≥ v, and for
Pr
(
Sn(t) ≥ nv − 1
)
work in the same way. The second parts of point (i) and (ii) result from a
direct application of the Ga¨rtner-Ellis Theorem.
Proof of Lemma 3: Rewriting the Tail Probabilities–1. Using (2) we can write
Pr
(
Sn ≥ αn
)
=
∫
z≥αn
P (dz) =
∫
z≥αn
dP
dPθ
(z)Pθ(dz)
=
∫
z≥αn
ϕn(θ)e
−θzPθ(dz) = ϕn(θ)e−θαnEθ
(
e−θ(Sn−αn)1Sn≥αn
)
= ϕn(θ)e
−θαn
∑
z≥αn, z∈Z
e−θ(z−αn)Pθ
(
Sn = z
)
.
And this proves the lemma since the other terms in (9) cancel each other out.
Proof of Lemma 5: Rewriting the Tail Probabilities–2. The summation term in (9) is
σn(θ) times the point probability Pθ (Sn − αn − Y = 0) where Y is independent of Sn and
Pθ(Y = y) =
(
1− e−θ) e−θy for y = 0, 1, 2, · · · (this works because θ > 0). Then Sn − αn − Y
is concentrated on Z with maximal step 1 and its characteristic function is
ϕn(θ + is/σn(θ))
ϕn(θ)
eisµn(θ)/σn(θ)eis(µn(θ)−αn)
1− e−θ
1− e−θ−is .
Using the inversion formula in (10), we obtain (11) after scaling the integrand.
Proof of Proposition 5: Convergence of the Best-Responses. LetK = [k, 1] with 0 <
k < t˜ if V ≤ v and k = 0 if V > v. For some fixed 0 < α < 1/2, we define the sets
I`N ≡
{
t ∈ [0, 1] : θˆ(t) ≥ Nα−1/2
}
∩ K,
ImN ≡
{
t ∈ [0, 1] : ∣∣θˆ(t)∣∣ ≤ N−α−1/2} ,
IhN ≡
{
t ∈ [0, 1] : θˆ(t) ≤ −Nα−1/2
}
.
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Note that, because θˆ is continuous, strictly decreasing in t and crosses 0 at t˜, I`N is of the form
[0, t0] (` stands for low t’s), I
m
N is of the form [t1, t2] with t1 < t˜ < t2 (m stands for middle t’s)
and IhN is of the form [t3, 1] (h stands for high t’s). Also for a given N , t0 < t1 < t2 < t3 so that
the intervals do not cover K.
Because θn converges uniformly to θˆ in O(1/n) (faster than 1/n1/2−α), it must be true that
for N sufficiently large and n ≥ N we can bound any θn(t) downward on I`N by θN ≡ 12N1/2−α .
For the same reason, we can bound any
∣∣θn(t)∣∣ downward by the same θN on IhN .
We divide the proof into six parts, the first five of which prove the uniform convergence.
Part I and II prove that
sup
n≥N
sup
t∈I`N
∣∣Rn(t)− exp(θˆ(t))∣∣
converges to 0 as N goes to infinity. Specifically, part I shows that each of the integrals at the
numerator and the denominator of the second fraction in (12) converges to (2pi)1/2 at a rate that
is independent of t on I`n. The second part shows that the first fraction in (12) converges to θˆ(t)
at a rate that does not depend on t on I`N . The third part deals with the intervals I
h
N , and the
fourth part with the intervals ImN . Finally part V puts the pieces together to conclude that the
convergence of Rn is uniform on K and implies the uniform convergence of the best-response
functions. Part VI proves all the remaining claims of the proposition.
Part I. First, we look at the interval I`N . As we just noted, θn(t) is bounded below by θN on
I`N . We start by decomposing each of the integrals of interest into several terms. We write the
decomposition for the integral at the denominator in (12), the convergence proof for the other
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integral is essentially the same.
+∞∫
−∞
e−
s2
2
1
1 + is
θnσn(θn)
ds
︸ ︷︷ ︸
T1
−
∫
|s|>piσn(θn)
e−
s2
2
1
1 + is
θnσn(θn)
ds
︸ ︷︷ ︸
T2
+
∫
In(θn)
e−
s2
2
1
1 + is
θnσn(θn)
(
J
(
θn,
s
σn(θn)
)
− 1
)
ds
︸ ︷︷ ︸
T3
+
∫
In(θn)
(
ϕθn
(
s
σn(θn)
)
− e− s
2
2
)
1
1 + is
θnσn(θn)
J
(
θn,
s
σn(θn)
)
ds
︸ ︷︷ ︸
T4
,
where γθ = e
−θ/
(
1− e−θ).
First Term T1. The first term is equal to B0(λ) defined above with λ = θnσn(θn). It is well
known (see Jensen, 1995, section 2.1) thatB0(λ) = 2piλe
λ2
2 (1− Φ(λ)) where Φ(.) is the standard
normal cdf. B0(λ) is strictly increasing in λ, and by Lemma 7 we know that λ > θNcσ
√
n for
every t ∈ I`n. We also know that B0(λ) converges to (2pi)1/2 when λ → ∞, so we can write,
that for every t ∈ I`n
0 ≤ (2pi)1/2 −B0 (θn(t)σn(θn(t))) ≤ (2pi)1/2 −B0
(
θNcσ
√
n
)
,
and conclude that
sup
n≥N
sup
t∈I`N
∣∣T1(n, t)− (2pi)1/2∣∣ −−−→
N→∞
0.
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Second Term T2. For the second term, we can write for every t ∈ [0, 1]∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∫
|s|>piσn(θn)
e−
s2
2
1
1 + is
θnσn(θn)
ds
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∫
|s|>picσ√n
∣∣∣∣∣e− s22 11 + is
θnσn(θn)
∣∣∣∣∣ ds
≤
∫
|s|>picσ√n
e−
s2
2 ds
≤
∫
|s|>picσ√n
e−
|s|
2 ds = 4e−
picσ
√
n
2 ,
so that the second term converges uniformly to 0. In the series of inequalities above, we used
the fact that for every x ∈ R ∣∣∣∣ 11 + ix
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1. (20)
Third Term T3. For the third term we start by writing that for any real number z
|J (θ, z)− 1| =
∣∣∣∣ izθ − γθ (1− e−iz)1 + γθ (1− e−iz)
∣∣∣∣
≤ (θ−1 + γθ)|z|,
where we used the inequalities |1− e−iz| ≤ |z| and
∣∣1 + γθ (1− e−iz)∣∣ = √(1 + γθ(1− cos(−z)))2 + (γθ sin(−z))2 ≥ 1. (21)
Using (20) as well, we conclude that, for every t ∈ I`N , we can bound the absolute value of the
third term upward by
θ−1N + γθN
cσ
√
n
∫ +∞
−∞
e−
s2
2 |s|ds = 2
(
θ−1N + γθN
cσ
√
n
)
.
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Because θ−1N and γθN are O(N1/2−α), we can conclude that
sup
n≥N
sup
t∈I`N
∣∣T3(n, t)∣∣ −−−→
N→∞
0.
Fourth Term T4. From Lemma 8 we obtain that for |s| ≤ C
√
n
∣∣∣∣ϕθn ( sσn(θn)
)
− e− s
2
2
∣∣∣∣ ≤ κ6c3σn1/2 |s|3 exp
(
−s
2
4
)
.
From (21) and Lemma 7, we have for every t ∈ I`N
∣∣∣∣J (θn, sσn(θn)
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1 + |s|θNcσn1/2 .
From (20), we deduce that the norm of T4 is bounded upward by
∫
|s|≤C√n
κ3
6c3σn
1/2
|s|3 exp
(
−s
2
4
)(
1 +
|s|
θNcσn
1/2
)
ds
︸ ︷︷ ︸
T4.1
+
∫
|s|≥C√n
exp
(
−s
2
2
)(
1 +
|s|
θNcσn
1/2
)
ds
︸ ︷︷ ︸
T4.2
+
∫
C
√
n≤|s|≤piσn(θn)
∣∣∣∣ϕθn ( sσn(θn)
)∣∣∣∣ (1 + |s|θNcσn1/2
)
ds
︸ ︷︷ ︸
T4.3
T4.1 is bounded upward by
2
(
1 +
C
θNcσ
)
κ3
6c3σn
1/2
∫ +∞
0
s3e−
s2
4 = 8
(
1 +
C
θNcσ
)
κ3
6c3σn
1/2
,
where the right-hand side is obtained by integration by part. It is immediate to conclude that
sup
n≥N
sup
t∈I`N
∣∣T4.1(n, t)∣∣ −−−→
N→∞
0.
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T4.2 is equal to
2
(∫ ∞
C
√
n
e−
s2
2 ds+
1
θNcσn
1/2
∫ ∞
C
√
n
se−
s2
2 ds
)
≤ 2
(∫ ∞
C
√
n
e−
s
2ds+
1
θNcσn
1/2
∫ ∞
C
√
n
se−
s2
2 ds
)
≤ 2
(
2e−
Cn1/2
2 +
1
θNcσn
1/2
e−
C2n
2
)
,
where we used the fact that e−
s2
2 ≤ e− s2 for positive and sufficiently large s. This proves that
sup
n≥N
sup
t∈I`N
∣∣T4.2(n, t)∣∣ −−−→
N→∞
0.
For T4.3, first note that C ≤ picσ ≤ piσn(θn) by construction. We need to go back to the
definition of ϕθ(.) in Lemma 5 to get the expression
∣∣∣∣ϕθn ( sσn(θn)
)∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣peis/σn(θn) + (1− p) e−θnp+ (1− p) e−θn
∣∣∣∣nV −1
∣∣∣∣∣peis/σn(θn) +
(
1− p) e−θn
p+
(
1− p) e−θn
∣∣∣∣∣
ncV
. (22)
At this point we use the fact that for any real number z ∈ [−pi, pi] and any a, b ∈ R,
|aeiz + b| ≤ |a+ b| , with a strict inequality if z 6= 0. This inequality and the fact that the
function
∣∣∣peiz+(1−p)e−θnp+(1−p)e−θn ∣∣∣ is continuous in t and z together imply that we can define the following
quantity
δ ≡ max
C/cσ≤z≤pi
max
t∈[0,1]
∣∣∣∣peiz + (1− p) e−θnp+ (1− p) e−θn
∣∣∣∣ < 1.
And similarly
δ ≡ max
C/cσ≤z≤pi
max
t∈[0,1]
∣∣∣∣∣peiz +
(
1− p) e−θn
p+
(
1− p) e−θn
∣∣∣∣∣ < 1.
Then the first term in (22) is bounded upward by δ
nV
and the second term by δn
c
V . Finally,
letting δ = max(δ, δ), we have obtained that
∣∣∣∣ϕθn ( sσn(θn)
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ δn−1,
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whenever C
√
n ≤ |s| ≤ piσn(θn) with δ < 1. Therefore we can bound T4.3 upward by
2δn−1
piCσ
√
n∫
C
√
n
(
1 +
s
θNcσn
1/2
)
ds ≤ δn−1 (piCσ − C)
√
n
(
1 +
piCσ
θNcσ
)
.
Therefore
sup
n≥N
sup
t∈I`N
∣∣T4.3(n, t)∣∣ −−−→
N→∞
0.
To sum up, we have shown that each of the integrals in the second fraction in (12) converges
to (2pi)1/2, call them J1(n, t) and J2(n, t) (say J1 is at the numerator), both satisfy
sup
n≥N
sup
t∈I`N
∣∣Jk(n, t)− (2pi)1/2∣∣ −−−→
N→∞
0.
This implies that
sup
n≥N
sup
t∈I`N
∣∣∣∣J1(n, t)J2(n, t) − 1
∣∣∣∣ −−−→N→∞ 0.
Part II. Now we consider the first fraction in (12). By Lemma 1, we know that θn and θ
′
n
converge uniformly to θˆ on K in O(1/n). Then for the ratio 1−e−θn
1−e−θ′n we can write
∣∣∣∣1− e−θn1− e−θ′n − 1
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣e−θ′n − e−θn∣∣
|1− e−θ′n| ,
and the numerator of the right-hand side is in O(1/n) while the denominator is minimized on
I lN at θN and is therefore in O(Nα−1/2) so that
sup
n≥N
sup
t∈I`N
∣∣∣∣1− e−θn(t)1− e−θ′n(t) − 1
∣∣∣∣ −−−→N→∞ 0.
Consider the ratio of the standard deviations
σn(θn)
σn(θ′n)
=
eθn−θ′n
(Vn−1/n)p(1−p)
(peθn+1−p)2
+
(1−Vn)p(1−p)
(peθn+1−p)2
(Vn−1/n)p(1−p)
(peθ′n+1−p)2
+
(1−Vn)p(1−p)
(peθ′n+1−p)2

1/2
.
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It is clear that eθn−θ
′
n converges to 1 uniformly on K, as for the second fraction, it is easy to
show that the numerator and the denominator both converge uniformly on K to
V p(1− p)(
peθˆ + 1− p
)2 + (1− V ) p(1− p)(
peθˆ + 1− p
)2 > 0,
implying that the fraction converges to 1 uniformly on K as well as the ratio of the standard
deviations.
By definition of θn and θ
′
n, we have K
′
n(θn)−K ′(θ′n) = 1. Since K ′ is continuously differen-
tiable, there exists some θ˜n between θn and θ
′
n such that K
′
n(θn) −K ′(θ′n) = (θn − θ′n)K ′′(θ˜n).
Since by definition K ′′n(θ) = σ
2
n(θ), we can write θn − θ′n = 1σ2n(θ˜n) . And since θ˜n is between θn
and θ′n, it converges uniformly to θˆ. Hence
σ2n(θ˜n)
n2
= eθ˜n
(
(Vn − 1/n) p(1− p)(
peθ˜n + 1− p)2 + (1− Vn) p(1− p)(peθ˜n + 1− p)2
)
converges uniformly to the finite valued function of t
eθˆ
 V p(1− p)(
peθˆ + 1− p
)2 + (1− V ) p(1− p)(
peθˆ + 1− p
)2
 > 0.
Therefore we can write that
env(θn−θ
′
n) = exp
(
1
n
· n
2
σ2n(θ˜n)
vn
)
,
converges uniformly to 1 on K.
Now consider the ratio
ϕn(θ
′
n)
ϕn(θn)
= exp (Kn(θ
′
n)−Kn(θn)) = exp
(
K ′n(θ˙n)(θn − θ′n)
)
,
where θ˙n is between θn and θ
′
n. Since K
′
n is increasing, the definitions of θn and θ
′
n imply that
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nv − 1 ≤ K ′n(θ˙n) ≤ nv and therefore
exp
(
(nv − 1)(θn − θ′n)
) ≤ ϕn(θ′n)
ϕn(θn)
≤ exp(nv(θn − θ′n)).
We have already argued that the upper bound converges uniformly to 1, and the same argument
obviously extends to the lower bound, hence the ratio itself converges to 1 uniformly on K.
To sum up, Part I and II show together that
sup
n≥N
sup
t∈I`N
∣∣Rn(t)− exp(θˆ(t))∣∣ −−−→
N→∞
0.
Part III. We want to show the same on IhN . For that, we use (8) in Lemma 2. It implies that
for every t ∈ IhN , and n sufficiently large
1
n
log
(
1− Pr(Sn(t) ≥ nv − 1)) ≤ −1
2
(
v|θˆ(t)| − κ(|θˆ(t)|)
)
.
Then, by taking the minimum of
(
v|θˆ(t)| − κ(|θˆ(t)|)
)
over t ∈ IhN and remembering that v >
κ′(θ) for θ > 0, we have for every t ∈ IhN
1
n
log
(
1− Pr(Sn(t) ≥ nv − 1)) ≤ −MN ,
with MN =
1
2
(
v|Nα−1/2| − κ(|Nα−1/2|)) > 0. In particular, MN is in O(Nα−1/2). Noticing that
Rn ≥ 1, we can write that for n ≥ N with N sufficiently large and for every t ∈ IhN
1 ≤ Rn(t) ≤ 1
1− e−nMN ,
which implies that
sup
n≥N
sup
t∈IhN
∣∣Rn(t)− 1∣∣ −−−→
N→∞
0.
Part IV. To prove the result on the intervals ImN , we use the same type of approximations
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as in Part I, but this time we work with Sn(t) and the original probability measure rather
than with the tilted probability measure Pθ. The idea is to use a central limit theorem to
approximate the distribution of the standardized random variable18 Zn(t) ≡ Sn(t)−nmn(t)sn(t) , where
sn(t) =
√
V arSn(t) around 0 by a normal distribution. However we need the approximation to
work uniformly for all t in a shrinking neighborhood of t˜, making the direct application of any
of the usual central limit theorems useless for our purpose.
Let γ(u) ≡ E eiuSn be the characteristic function of Sn. By Lemma 4, we can write for any
k ∈ {0, . . . , n}
Pr (Sn ≥ αn) =
n−αn∑
z=0
(2pi)−1
∫ pi
−pi
exp (−iuαn) e−iuzγ(u)du
=
n−αn∑
z=0
(2pisn)
−1
∫ pisn
−pisn
exp
(
−is(αn − nmn)
sn
)
e−iz
s
sn γ
(
s
sn
)
e−ismn/snds
=
n−αn∑
z=0
(2pisn)
−1
∫ pisn
−pisn
exp
(
−is(αn + z − nmn)
sn
)
γ˜
(
s
sn
)
ds, (23)
where γ˜
(
s
sn
)
≡ γ
(
s
sn
)
e−
isnmn
sn is the characteristic function of Zn.
We show that for αn ∈ {nv, nv − 1} these integrals (respectively at the numerator and the
denominator of Rn) satisfy
sup
n≥N
sup
t∈ImN
∣∣Pr (Sn ≥ αn)− 1/2∣∣ −−−→
N→∞
0,
thus implying that
sup
n≥N
sup
t∈ImN
∣∣Rn(t)− 1∣∣ −−−→
N→∞
0.
18These notations were already introduced in the paragraph preceding Lemma 9.
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Before starting, note that since m∞(t˜) ≡ limn→∞mn(t) = v, we can write
∣∣∣∣nv − nmn(t)sn(t)
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣nvn −mn(t)sn(t)
∣∣∣∣
≤ c−1s n1/2
(∣∣vn − v∣∣+ ∣∣m∞(t˜)−m∞(t)∣∣+ ∣∣mn(t)−m∞(t)∣∣).
The first term on the right-hand side is bounded upward by 1/n, the last term is equal to∣∣(Vn − 1/n − V )p(t) + (V − Vn)p(t)∣∣ ≤ 3/n for every t ∈ [0, 1]. The second term is bounded
upward by
V p(t)
∣∣∣∣∣ p(t)eθˆ(t)p(t) + (1− p(t))eθˆ(t) − 1
∣∣∣∣∣+ (1− V )p(t
∣∣∣∣∣ p(t)eθˆ(t)p(t) + (1− p(t))eθˆ(t) − 1
∣∣∣∣∣ ,
which in turn can be bounded upward by
(V p(t) + (1− V )p(t))∣∣eθˆ(t) − 1∣∣ ≤ ∣∣eθˆ(t) − 1∣∣.
Because there exists a neighborhood V of 0 such that ∣∣eθ − 1∣∣ ≤ 2θ for θ ∈ V , it must be true
that for n sufficiently large, we can write
sup
t∈ImN
∣∣eθˆ(t) − 1∣∣ ≤ 2N−(α+1/2).
Noticing that a similar reasoning can be made by replacing nv by nv − 1/n, these calculations
lead to the following result.
Remark 1. For αn ∈ {nv, nv − 1/n}, we have
sup
n≥N
sup
t∈ImN
∣∣∣∣αn − nmn(t)sn(t)
∣∣∣∣ −−−→N→∞ 0.
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Now going back to the main argument, we decompose (23) as follows
(2pisn)
−1
n−αn∑
z=0
∫ +∞
−∞
exp
(
−is(αn + z − nmn)
sn
)
e−
s2
2 ds
−(2pisn)−1
n−αn∑
z=0
∫
|s|>pisn
exp
(
−is(αn + z − nmn)
sn
)
e−
s2
2 ds
+(2pisn)
−1
n−αn∑
z=0
∫ pisn
−pisn
exp
(
−is(αn + z − nmn)
sn
)(
γ˜
(
s
sn
)
− e s
2
2
)
ds. (24)
We proceed term by term.
First Term. The integral in the first term is well defined and it is the inversion formula for the
characteristic function e−
s2
2 of the standard normal distribution, hence by Lemma 6 it is equal
to 2piφ
(
αn+z−nmn
sn
)
, where φ(x) = (2pi)−1/2e−
x2
2 is the pdf of the standard normal distribution.
Therefore the first term is equal to
n−αn∑
z=0
s−1n φ
(
αn + z − nmn
sn
)
. (25)
A Taylor expansion of the cdf of the standard normal distribution Φ yields for every z
s−1n φ
(
αn + z − nmn
sn
)
=
Φ
(
αn − nmn + z + 1
sn
)
− Φ
(
αn − nmn + z
sn
)
− s−2n φ′
(
αn − nmn + ζ(z)
sn
)
,
where ζ(z) ∈ [0, 1]. Hence (25) is equal to
Φ
(
n(1−mn)
sn
)
− Φ
(
αn − nmn
sn
)
− s−2n
n−αn∑
z=0
φ′
(
αn − nmn
sn
+
ζ(z)
sn
)
.
Because mn(t) converges to V p(t) + (1− V )p(t) which is uniformly (in t) bounded upward by
V + (1− V )p˜ < 1, and because sn(t) is uniformly bounded upward by Cs
√
n, the first term of
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this equation converges to 1 uniformly for t ∈ [0, 1]. By Remark 1, we also have
sup
n≥N
sup
t∈ImN
∣∣∣∣Φ(αn − nmnsn
)
− Φ(0)
∣∣∣∣ −−−→N→∞ 0.
Finally the last term is bounded upward in absolute value by
(2pi)−1/2c−2s n
−1(n− αn)
(∣∣∣∣αn − nmnsn
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣ 1sn
∣∣∣∣) ,
and by Remark 1 and Lemma 9,
sup
n≥N
sup
t∈ImN
(2pi)−1/2c−2s n
−1(n− αn)
(∣∣∣∣αn − nmnsn
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣ 1sn
∣∣∣∣) −−−→N→∞ 0.
Second Term. For n sufficiently large, the absolute value of the integral in the second term
of (24) is bounded upward by
2
∫
s>pisn
e−
s
2 ≤ 4e− cs
√
n
2 .
Therefore, using Lemma 9, the absolute value of the second term of (24) is bounded upward
by 2n
1/2
pics
e−
cs
√
n
2 , which converges to 0 uniformly for t ∈ [0, 1].
Third Term. For the last term of (24), we start by switching the integral and the sum signs,
which can be done since the sum is finite and the integral is well defined. After scaling the
integrand by pi, we have
(2sn)
−1
sn∫
−sn
exp
(
−ispi(αn − nmn)
sn
)
H
(
pis
sn
, αn
)(
γ˜
(
pis
sn
)
− e− (pis)
2
2
)
ds,
where H(u, αn) ≡
∑n−αn
z=0 e
−iuz. For s 6= 0 we have
H
(
pis
sn
, αn
)
=
 1 if n− αn is even1 + e− ipissn if n− αn is odd ,
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and H(0, nv) = 1 + n− αn. That is, the absolute value of H
(
pis
sn
, αn
)
is bounded upward by 2
on every compact set that excludes 0, and by n on any compact neighborhood of 0. Therefore,
the last term of (24) is bounded upward in absolute value by
(pisn)
−1
pisn∫
−pisn
∣∣∣∣γ˜ ( ssn
)
− e− s
2
2
∣∣∣∣ ds+ (2pisn)−1
1/n2∫
−1/n2
n
(∣∣∣∣γ˜ ( ssn
)∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣e− s22 ∣∣∣) ds. (26)
Both
∣∣∣γ˜ ( ssn)∣∣∣ and ∣∣∣e− s22 ∣∣∣ are bounded upward by 1, and with Lemma 9, we can conclude
that the second term in (26) is bounded upward by 2(pics)
−1n−3/2 which goes to 0 independently
of t as n goes to infinity.
For the first term of (26), we use Lemma 10 which implies that for |u| ≤ C ′√n
∣∣∣∣γ˜ ( usn(t)
)
− e−u
2
2
∣∣∣∣ ≤ k6c3sn1/2 |u|3 exp
(
−u
2
4
)
.
Hence the absolute value of the first term in (26) is bounded upward by
(pisn)
−1
∫
|u|≤C′√n
k
6c3sn
1/2
|u|3 exp
(
−u
2
4
)
du
︸ ︷︷ ︸
T1
+ (pisn)
−1
∫
|u|>C′√n
e−
u2
2 du
︸ ︷︷ ︸
T2
+ (pisn)
−1
∫
C′
√
n≤|u|≤pisn
∣∣∣∣γ˜ ( usn
)∣∣∣∣ du︸ ︷︷ ︸
T3
.
We have
T1 ≤ 2(pisn)−1 k
6c3sn
1/2
∫ ∞
0
s3e−
s2
4 ds ≤ 4k
3pic4sn
,
where the last term is obtained by Lemma 9 and integration by part. Hence T1 goes to 0
independently of t as n goes to infinity.
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T2 is bounded upward by 2(pics
√
n)−1e−
C′√n
2 which goes to 0 independently of t as n goes
to infinity.
Finally, for T3, we start by noting that C
′ ≤ pics ≤ pisn by construction (see Lemma 10).
By definition of γ˜, we have
∣∣∣∣γ˜ ( ssn
)∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣pei ssn + 1− p∣∣∣nV −1 ∣∣∣pei ssn + 1− p∣∣∣ncV ,
and at this point we use the fact that for any real number z ∈ [pi, pi] and any real numbers a
and b, ∣∣aeiz + b∣∣ ≤ |a+ b| ,
with a strict inequality if z 6= 0. This inequality and the fact that the function |peiz + 1− p| is
continuous in t imply together that we can define the following quantity
δ ≡ max
C/cs≤z≤pi
max
t∈[0,1]
∣∣peiz + 1− p∣∣ < 1.
And similarly
δ ≡ max
C/cs≤z≤pi
max
t∈[0,1]
∣∣peiz + 1− p∣∣ < 1.
Then the term under the integral in t3 is bounded upward by δ
nV −1
δn
c
V ≤ δn−1 where δ ≡
max{δ, δ} < 1. Finally, this shows that t3 is bounded upward by (pics)−1δn−1(piCs − C ′) which
goes to 0 independently of t as n goes to infinity.
All this shows that the last term in (24) goes to 0 uniformly on [0, 1].
To conclude, since 1− Φ(0) = 1/2 we have proved that for αn ∈ {nv, nv − 1},
sup
n≥N
sup
t∈ImN
∣∣Pr (Sn ≥ αn)− 1/2∣∣ −−−→
N→∞
0,
thus implying that
sup
n≥N
sup
t∈ImN
∣∣Rn(t)− 1∣∣ −−−→
N→∞
0.
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To finish the proof, we need to show that
sup
n≥N
sup
t∈ImN
∣∣Rn(t)− ρ(t)∣∣ −−−→
N→∞
0.
For that, we just write that
sup
n≥N
sup
t∈ImN
∣∣Rn(t)− ρ(t)∣∣ ≤ sup
n≥N
sup
t∈ImN
∣∣Rn(t)− 1∣∣+ sup
n≥N
sup
t∈ImN
∣∣ρ(t)− 1∣∣.
The first term converges to 0 as we just proved. We know that ρ is continuous, increasing and
bounded upward by 1. Hence the second term is bounded upward by 1−ρ(min{t ∈ ImN }),which
by definition converges to 1− ρ(t˜) = 0.
Part V. Fix some ε > 0. We just proved that there exists N`, Nm and Nh such that for every
k ∈ {`,m, h}, and for every N ≥ Nk,
sup
n≥N
sup
t∈IkN
∣∣Rn(t)− ρ(t)∣∣ < ε.
Fix Nm and choose N
′
` ≥ N` and N ′h ≥ Nh such that
(
max {N ′`, N ′h}
)α−1/2
< N
−α−1/2
m , so
that I`N ′`
∪ ImNm ∪ IhN ′h = K. Then it is clear that for every n > max {Nm, N
′
h, N
′
`} we have
supt∈K
∣∣Rn(t)− ρ(t)∣∣ < ε, which proves that Rn(t) converges uniformly on K.
Part VI. The continuity of β at every t 6= t˜ can be deduced from the continuity of θˆ(t) which
is implied by the continuity of p and p and the continuity of θˆ in p and p. For the continuity
at t˜, it is implied by the fact that the solution of (3) is eθˆ = 1 if and only if V p+ (1− V )p = v,
that is if and only if t = t˜. Therefore limt↑t˜ e
θˆ(t) = 1, implying the continuity of β at t˜.
The sense of variation of β with respect to t, v and V can be deduced from that of θˆ which
was analyzed in Lemma 1.
Proof of Proposition 6: Convergence of the Thresholds. (i) is just a consequence of
the fact that θˆ(0) is finite if and only if V > v and is otherwise infinite, which is proved in the
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proof of Lemma 1. Hence β(0) = 0 if and only if V ≤ v, and otherwise β(0) > 0.
For (ii), let g(t) ≡ β(t)− t and gn(t) ≡ βn(t)− t. By Proposition 5, gn converges uniformly
to g on any compact K ⊂ (0, 1]. Since tn ∈ T ∗n , we can write
∣∣g(tn)∣∣ = ∣∣g(tn)− gn(tn)∣∣. Suppose
t∞ 6= 0. Fix some ε > 0 and choose K = [t∞/2, 1]. For n sufficiently large, tn ∈ K. The uniform
convergence of gn on K implies that for n sufficiently large, we can bound
∣∣g(tn)−gn(tn)∣∣ upward
by ε. Since tn ∈ T ∗n we have gn(tn) = 0, hence |g(t∗)| = limn→∞ |g(tn)− gn(tn)| ≤ ε, for every
ε > 0, implying that g(t∗) = 0. Now suppose that t∞ = 0. If V > v, the convergence of gn(.)
is uniform on [0, 1] and the argument we just gave would imply t∞ = 0 ∈ T ∗ which cannot be
true by (i). Hence the only possibility is that v ≤ V , and therefore t∞ = 0 ∈ T ∗.
For (iii), let B = {t ∈ [0, 1] : d(t, T ∗) ≥ δ}. B is closed because the distance function
d(., T ∗) is continuous, and since B is also clearly bounded, it is a compact set. Let B+ =
{t ∈ B : g(t) ≥ 0} and B− = {t ∈ B : g(t) ≤ 0}. These two sets are also compact sets by conti-
nuity of f , they are closed sets. Then we can define ε+ = 1
2
inft∈B+ g(t) and ε− = 12 inft∈B− −g(t).
These numbers are strictly positive because of the definition of B+ and B−. Let ε = min(ε−, ε+).
We know that gn converges uniformly to g on B because B is a compact set and by (i), 0 ∈ B
if and only if V > v. Then there exists some N such that for every n > N and every t ∈ B,∣∣f(t) − fn(t)∣∣ < ε. But then ∣∣gn(t)∣∣ > ∣∣g(t)∣∣ − ε > 0, where the second inequality comes from
the fact that either t ∈ B− or t ∈ B+ and from the definition of ε. In particular T ∗N ⊆ [0, 1]rB.
Finally, for (iv), note that if β(.) crosses the 45◦-line at t∗, then g(.) changes sign at t∗.
Then for ε > 0 small enough, [t∗ − ε, t∗ + ε] ⊂ (0, 1) is such that g(t∗ − ε)g(t∗ + ε) < 0.
Because gn(.) converges to g(.), there exists N such that for every n ≥ N and we have
|gn(t∗ ± ε)− g(t∗ ± ε)| < |g(t∗ ± ε)| /2. But then it must be true that g(t∗ ± ε) has the same
sign as gn(t
∗ ± ε), implying that gn(t∗ + ε)gn(t− ε) < 0. Hence for every ε there exists N such
that n ≥ N sufficiently large , we can choose tn ∈ T ∗n such that |tn − t∗| < ε.
Proof of Proposition 8. We make the argument for an increase in V . By Proposition 7,
T ∗(v, V ′) ≥ T ∗(v, V ). Let τ = supT ∗(v, V ) and τ ′ = supT (v, V ′). Suppose τ ′ > τ . Let g(t) ≡
β(t; v, V )− t and g′(t) ≡ β(t; v, V ′)− t. Because for any pair of voting rules β(1) ≤ tnaive < 1,
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we know that g(1) < 0. Hence at τ g is either reaching a maximum or crossing 0, and the same
holds for τ ′ and g′(.). If τ ′ is a crossing point we know that there exists a sequence {t′n} of
points in T ∗n(V
′, v) that converges to τ ′ and with point (iii) of Proposition 6 we can conclude.
Suppose that τ ′ is a maximum of g′(.). Then there exists a point t0 in the left neighborhood
of τ ′ such that g′(t0) < 0. Now since β(.) is strictly increasing in V at τ , it must be that
g′(τ) > g(τ) = 0, and by continuity of g′(.), there exists a point t′ between τ and t0 at which
g′(.) crosses 0. But then there exists a sequence {t′n} of points in T ∗n(V ′, v) that converges to
t′ > τ and with point (iii) of Proposition 6 we can conclude.
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